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
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# CENTRAL

# INTELLIGENCE

# BULLETIN





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The harsh tone and far-reaching demands of the Soviet Government's statement of 14 February reflect Moscow's determination to exploit Lumumba's death to discredit and terminate the UN operation in the Congo. By making demands which are probably unacceptable to the majority of UN members, the Soviet leaders are seeking to discredit Hammar- Po 447 skjold, exploit widespread concern over the effects of Lumumba's death, and strengthen the Soviet bargaining position in future talks on a Congo settlement. Moscow's statement probably foreshadows increased pressure on the Sudan to permit transit of Soviet aid to Stanleyville, and raises the possibility of formal Soviet recognition of Gizenga's regime.

\*Reprisals against whites for Lumumba's death may still take place, although the Gizenga regime at this time is attempting to prevent them.

Gizenga issued instructions to his troops to maintain order, although he stated he still expected Gizenga disturbances to occur. "is resolved upon vengeance," but that he lacks the means to carry out his intent.

Hammarskjold has sent orders to UN headquarters in Leopoldville to stop all operations by the various Congolese military forces. Execution of these orders will primarily affect Mobutu's operations in Equateur Province and Tshombe's offensive in northern Katanga.

(Backup, Page 1) (Map)

Diral

as far as Moscow is concerned the Laotian crisis could easily be solved by compromise

Peiping had quite a different attitude which would make a general agreement difficult. Despite this statement of difference both Moscow and Peiping in official and private statements have made it clear that they favor the convening of an international conference on Laos before any other approach is taken.

General Phoumi meanwhile has given an initial favorable reaction to a US proposal that a neutral nations commission be established.

up, Page 4) (Map)

\*Berlin: The East Germans have in effect formally served notice on Bonn that they do not now intend to fulfill their previous commitment to relax restrictions on West Germans traveling to East Berlin. In a meeting between the East and West German trade representatives on 8 February the East German official read a prepared statement citing West German publication of one aspect of last December's secret agreement as the pretext for not fulfilling the pact. The formal statement and the subsequent action preventing West German church leaders from attending a meeting in East Berlin last week end appear intended as a test by the East Germans of West German firmness; the USSR does not appear interested in creating a crisis over Berlin at this time. East Germans may feel that Bonn would be reluctant to terminate again the interzonal trade agreements. A West German cabinet meeting is scheduled for 15 February to consider the new situation and possible means of rotalistics

India - Communist China: Nehru's release to the Indian Parliament on 14 February of official reports on the abortive Sino-Indian border talks underscores the deadlock between New Delhi and Peiping. The reports, submitted separately by the Indian and Chinese experts who compared historical evidence of their claims in Peiping, New Delhi, and Rangoon from June to December 1960, point up the sharp differences between the two

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sides and leave little basis for further early efforts toward a solution. The reports also indicate that Peiping refuses to recognize India's special rights in Bhutan and Sikkim under treaties with those Himalayan states. While reiterating his refusal to accept Chinese occupation of Indian territory, Nehru continues to stress a peaceful solution to the dispute. There now seems even less likelihood that Nehru, who will come under increasing domestic pressure to take firmer action against China, will go to Peiping in response to Chou En-lai's invitation last April. (Backup, Page 6) (Map)

Albania-Bloc: Party leader Enver Hoxha, in a belligerent address at the opening of the Albanian party congress on 13 February, admitted publicly for the first time that a coup had been attempted against his regime last summer for which he blamed the US, Greece, and Yugoslavia. However, our evidence pleads us to believe that the coup was undertaken by pro-Soviet elements in the Albanian regime and possibly was Soviet inspired. Hoxha's assertion that the conspirators and proof of their activity "are in the hands of the people's justice" sets the stage for an anti-Western show trial. The tone and purpose of such a trial, paralleling Peiping's virulent anti-Western position, would further alienate Hoxha from Moscow.

(Backup, Page 8)

Turkey: Recent cabinet changes and confusion over the future role of the political parties newly approved by the ruling military junta have again aroused public concern. It remains doubtful whether any of the new parties, created during the last few weeks, can seriously challenge the established Republican People's party in national elections promised later in 1961 by the regime. As long as the Committee of National Union governs without allowing the transitional civil organs of government—cabinet and constituent assembly—to assume sig—last 2 nificant responsibility, the political situation will remain un—serts P4 stable.

(Backup, Page 10)

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Angola: Portuguese authorities in Lisbon consider the situation in Angola extremely bad; all borders have been officially closed and the counter-espionage security forces have been reinforced, Investigations so far have reportedly supplied no proof that the disorders since early February have been linked to any groups operating outside of Angola. However; the organized manner of the attack on police stations on 4 February and the distinctive clothing worn by rioters on 10 February indicate planning, and local officials fear that incidents may recur. spread African unrest and intense hatred of the Portuguese. but local Portuguese authorities are for the present in no danger of being overthrown. Backup, Page 12) Cuba: Foreign Communist leaders, in Havana during the early January commemoration of the second anniversary of the Cuban revolution, showed particular interest in the modus

early January commemoration of the second anniversary of the Cuban revolution, showed particular interest in the modus operandi of the Cuban Communists and in the part they are playing in the regime. Cuban Communist leaders reportedly told a group of leading Arab Communists that the alliance between the Castro regime and the Communists' Popular Socialist party is "exceedingly close" and that the party, with Castro's consent, controls all the "organizations which direct the masses." They maintain that the Cuban revolution will play the same role in Latin America as the Soviet and Chinese Communist revolutions did in Europe, and Asia.

(Backup, Page 14)

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## Soviet Government Declaration on the Congo

The Soviet leaders obviously view Lumumba's death as providing an excellent opportunity to carry forward their campaign against colonialism and again identify the USSR with extremist, anti-Western forces in Africa and Asia.

The Soviet Government's statement of 14 February revived the harsh tone of Khrushchev's indictment of colonialism and the United Nations' role in the Congo at the General Assembly last fall. The demands made in this statement were included in the draft resolution circulated by the Soviets yesterday for presentation at the UN Security Council today. The statement and resolution suggest that the Soviet leaders may hope that Lumumba's death will lead to the collapse of the UN operation through the withdrawal of the remaining Afro-Asian contingents--most immediately those of Morocco, Ghana, and Indonesia. Moscow would exploit to the hilt the dispatch of Western troops as an attempt to reimpose colonial rule in the Congo. The Soviet leaders probably believe direct Western intervention would make it extremely difficult or impossible for the West to marshal the support of moderate Afro-Asian powers for a new approach for a Congo settlement.

The Soviet statement's call on all 'freedom-loving states' to respond to the appeal for aid issued by the 'legit-imate government of the Congo' headed by acting premier Gizenga and the avowal of Soviet support for the Stanleyville regime appear to foreshadow formal recognition of this regime. Such a step would be calculated to bring pressure on Afro-Asian governments to follow suit and also to prepare legal justification for more vigorous bloc efforts to open a channel for extending direct aid to Gizenga's forces.

The USSR may plan to follow this statement with a proposal that the UN operation be replaced by a supervisory commission drawn from Afro-Asian states which support the Gizenga regime.

In addition to this attempt to discredit and terminate the UN operation and block any effective Western-backed UN

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action to deal with the crisis, the Soviet leaders are seizing upon Lumumba's death as a pretext for reviving their charges against Hammarskjold. Since Khrushchev's sharp attacks on the secretary general's conduct of the UN operation, it has been apparent that Hammarskjold has been selected to serve as the scapegoat for Soviet setbacks in the Congo last fall. Moscow's latest demand for his dismissal and its declared refusal to recognize his authority as secretary general probably do not foreshadow a Soviet-led bloc withdrawal from the UN. This latest statement only makes more explicit the position Khrushchev took last fall in his pronouncements before the General Assembly. He warned at that time that Hammarskjold's failure to resign would lead the USSR to draw the "necessary conclusions" and threatened to withhold Soviet cooperation with any of his decisions. At one point, Khrushchev hinted that if Soviet demands for revamping the UN executive machinery were not accepted, the bloc might withdraw and form a separate international organization. However, he stopped short of making any specific threats or commitments on this point.

As long as he believes he has the support of the smaller UN members, Hammarskjold is unlikely to resign. However, the USSR's refusal to recognize his authority will make the conduct of UN operations more difficult.

skjoid has already ordered the UN force to occupy airfields and other communication centers and to set up military control points in areas of Congolese military action. The UN Command reportedly has been ordered to stop all forces engaged in offensive action but to use force only if force is used against it. However, the small size of the UN units, coupled with the equivocal nature of the directives themselves, will render effective UN control difficult. Neutralist nations reportedly believe that the Security Council should pass an emergency resolution urging that all possible measures be taken to avoid civil war and calling for the cessation of Belgian and other foreign interference. Representatives of Nigeria, a leader of moderate Afro-Asian opinion, have stated that if Hammarskjold moves rapidly to take over temporary control of the Congo,


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SR remains in the UN, it will have to ess with the Secretariat, the staff of y loyal to Hammarskjold. The USSR ent of Hammarskjold's predecessor, or 1950, linking him to the UN action al Assembly later that year extended three years. The Soviet bloc respond Lie as secretary general for the ensuisure finally forced him to resign in 19
ess with the Secretariat, the staff of y loyal to Hammarskjold. The USSR ent of Hammarskjold's predecessor, or 1950, linking him to the UN action at Assembly later that year extended three years. The Soviet bloc respond Lie as secretary general for the ensui
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#### Situation in Laos

In a conversation with Ambassador Brown in Vientiane, Phoumi stated that a full-scale Council of Ministers' conference under King Savang's chairmanship would be held shortly. The meeting may result in a statement affirming Laotian neutrality and inviting a neutral nations commission to Laos. The conference is also expected to consider steps to broaden the Boun Oum government, now representative chiefly of southern Laos. In a further effort to enlist former Premier Souvanna Phouma's participation in some capacity, the Laotian government announced yesterday that it is considering sending Phoumi to Cambodia to discuss Souvanna Phouma's 'possible return' to Vientiane. Phoumi has expressed a willingness to try to approach Souvanna Phouma personally in Phnom Penh. Phoumi told Brown that he would have preferred to postpone international and domestic action toward a political solution until after recapture of the Plaine des Jarres, but he appreciated the urgency of the situation and felt the government's bargaining position had improved since the army "had regained the initiative."

The Chinese Nationalist irregulars who retreated into northwestern Laos from Burma have been ordered. to withdraw farther into Namtha Province to avoid provoking the Chinese Communists. about 700-800 minority tribesmen among the irregulars will be organized into an army battalion stationed at Namtha village; the remainder will be grouped into units under army control. They will be used in mopping-up operations west of Muong Sai to support government forces in that town and to cut off Pathet Lao reinforcements from Phong Saly Province who might try to get south of that blocking position. This plan to utilize the irregulars may be countermanded by higher authorities in Vientiane. General Phoumi has expressed awareness that such use would invite intervention by the Chinese Communists, and he has stated that he is insisting that the irregulars be disarmed if they are to remain in Laos. Moscow's reply to the British ICC proposal on 21 January was still being drafted. <del>SECRET</del>



	the reply would point out that any inter-
	national commission must now have both a political and mili-
	tary role, and its tasks therefore could only be defined by a
	new international conference. this was also the po-
-	sition of Communist China, North Vietnam, and Cambodia.
	the need for action was
	urgent, only a conference could restore peace
	in Laos in accordance with the Geneva agreements.
	the USSR was anxious to learn the US attitude to
	ward an international conference.
	Airlift operations between North Vietnam and points in
	Laos continue to be scheduled.
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#### **CHINESE COMMUNIST - INDIAN BORDER AREA** Boundary shows on recent Chinese Communist mans Road constructed by Boundary shows on recent Pakistani mapis Areas in Bhutan claimed by Chinese Communists. (Status in dispute) CEASE FIRE LINE Areas Occupied by Chinese Communists ----- Metorable road Minor road or trail WEST? TIBET BHUTANESE EXCLAVES C CHINA NEW DELHI NEPAL BURMA DIA MILES JEAST PAKISTAN A915.2

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#### Sino-Indian Border Dispute Remains Deadlocked

The meeting between Nehru and Chou En-lai in April 1960 in New Delhi was a major attempt to repair the damage to their relations caused by the border incidents of 1959. Although the meeting was almost totally unproductive, the leaders did agree, primarily as a means of buying time and forestalling further incidents, to a series of meetings by Foreign Ministry experts to "compare" and "examine" the documentation upon which each side bases its border claims in the Indo-Tibetan region. The reports which Nehru has laid before Parliament comprise the findings of those experts.

The major points of difference which emerged from the technical talks were: (1) China's refusal to discuss with India the borders of Sikkim and Bhutan--Himalayan border states over which India exercises protectorate powers-thereby denying India's "special" relationship with these states; and (2) China's reported refusal to discuss the Ladakh area except on the basis of New Delhi's acknowledgment that Indian sovereignty over Kashmir is still in question.

Peiping will probably counter Indian charges that China's support for its border claims is "weak and sketchy" in contrast to the "wealth" of Indian evidence by alleging that India's claims involve territory taken from China by British "imperialists" at a time when India was under British rule. The Chinese will persist in their attempts to blame the border stalemate on New Delhi. Peiping's propaganda continues to describe the Chinese border accords with Burma and Nepal as evidence that only India's recalcitrance prevents the adoption of a compromise settlement in the Sino-Indian dispute. The Chinese are now said to be interested in opening negotiations with Pakistan for a demarcation of the Sino-Pakistani border—at least in the Hunza area. As part of its pressure tactics, Peiping may also bring increased pressure on Bhutan for bilateral discussion of the border.

Nehru faces an increasingly difficult problem. His efforts over the past year to pave the way for a peaceful solution have proved futile, a fact which critics inside and outside the Congress party will use with increasing vigor as the 1962 elections

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approach. Nonetheless, in rejecting any course of which risks major conflict with China, the Indian no alternative but to pursue his present dual polic ening the country's defense position and maintaining tone in official statements, while exerting maximum pressure against Peipingespecially via Moscow.	leader has y of strength ng a strong um diplomati

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#### Coup Attempt in Albania Last Summer

Rear Admiral Temi Sejko and other high-ranking Albanian military officers probably were the leaders of the coup attempt last summer, according to a number of reports.

Sejko, who had been vice commander in chief of the Albanian Navy, had been cashiered from the navy. Several party and government officials in southern districts of Albania where the revolt was based were probably also implicated. Between July and September, the party boss of one district was demoted and two provincial government administrators were removed, allegedly because of involvement in the coup plan. During this same period, between 200 and 500 party members were purged, many of them reportedly for holding pro-Soviet views.

Subsequently, at a party central committee meeting in early September, politburo member Liri Belishova and auditing commission chief Koco Tashko were removed from their posts. Tashko was accused of "anti-state activities" and was ousted from the party. Belishova, who was charged with "errors in the party line," was allowed to retain her party membership. It later became apparent that both were being punished for advocating that the Albanian party align itself completely with the Soviet Union.

Albania's continuing pro-Chinese alignment was underscored by the arrival on 9 February of a Chinese "friendship" delegation. This group is touring Albania, making speeches about the close friendship between Tirana and Peiping, and is receiving wide coverage in the Albanian press.

The pro-Moscow delegations from the Soviet bloc now in Tirana for the Albanian party congress are evidently prepared to speak on those issues over which Tirana is in conflict with Moscow. Each of the bloc delegations contains specialists in ideology, organization, or party discipline, and several delegations include persons who participated in the big conference of 81 Communist parties held in Moscow last November. The level of the bloc delegations is comparable to that of delegations to the last Albanian party

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congress in 1956, but is generally lower than those of bloc delegations to party congresses held in the other European satellites in the last two years. The Chinese, Czech, North Korean, and North Vietnamese delegations are led by presidium or politburo members, but most of the delegations are headed by central committee members. The Soviet group is led by Pyotr Pospelov, a candidate presidium member who also led the Soviet delegation to Tirana in 1956. Another of the Soviet delegates is Yuri Andropov, one of the three authors of Moscow's rebuttal of Belgrade's views as expressed by Yugoslav ideologist Kardeli in his "Socialism and War" last fall.

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P	olitical Situation in Turkey	
go ly (R in by m	The Committee of National Union (CNU) appears to be vided as to which political group should take over when the vernment reverts to civil control. Some members strong-favor the politically powerful Republican People's party PP), led by the 77-year-old former President Inonu; others, cluding General Gursel, look to the New Turkey party headed former Minister of Finance Alican, a former Freedom party ember, as a desirable alternative to the RPP. Six additional litical parties are also being formed.	
tic pr  fo:	If no strong alternative to the RPP develops soon, some embers of the CNU may be reluctant to hold national electors this fall. Any attempt to renege on this commitment might ecipitate a power struggle. The party of the ousted regime the Democratic party-has been abolished by the CNU, but rmer members may join other parties if they have not been aplicated in the charges against the Bayar-Menderes regime.	
ind lyi vii of ati	The recent resignations of Minister of Reconstruction was and Minister of Education Feyzioglu do not in themselves dicate dissension within the CNU, but they do reflect the undering weakness of the regime. Feyzioglu apparently became connecd that the executive authority remained firmly in the hands the CNU members, despite the gesture of creating a represent we constituent assembly. All decisions of any importance e made by the CNU.	-
mi	Additional elements of potential instability are the 14 of- ers ousted from the CNU last November, several thousand litary officers forced into early retirement, and other dis- nting groups and individuals throughout the country.	]
	the regime continues to be sensitive to even nor expressions of dissatisfaction.	
to	The trials of the leaders of the former regime now appear be entering their final phase; the chief prosecutor claims they	7
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over ma	by late any of the President	defendants	The threat , including	of execution age ex-Premie	still hangs r Menderes	

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#### Security Situation Worsening in Angola

Portuguese concern over conditions in	Angola	
reported the "high degree of nervous tensi expressed his fear that violence might spr		
with "directives heard on Moscow radio." addition to incidents in Luandawhere sor	ne 40 persons have	
been killedthere have been several disorders in the interior of northern Angola. In one of these a military patrol suffered		
casualties but killed 41 attacking natives.		

The leading organization of anti-Communist Angolan nationalists is the Union of the Angolan People (UPA), whose leader, Roberto Holden, is in exile. He attributes the Luanda incidents to a militant minority led by Portuguese Communists and to the rival pro-Communist organization, the African Revolutionary Front for the Independence of Portuguese Colonies in Africa (FRAIN), based at Conakry. Holden reportedly refused a request several weeks ago to lend UPA support to attempts to free political prisoners in Luanda. Now, he is discouraged that the current violence, with resultant reprisals, destroys any chance for negotiating political reforms with the Portuguese.

Continuing outbursts of antigovernment violence in Luanda suggest that the long calm of the Portuguese African territories may be coming to an end. While neither the Portuguese Government, nor the loyalty of any of its African provinces appears to be in any immediate danger, Portugal appears headed for a period of intense political maneuvering or even unrest.

The overseas territories are almost certain to be exposed to external pressures over the next few years. The problem is likely to be intensified by white settler reactions to domination by Lisbon. These are generally of three kinds: (1) simple hostility to Salazar's leadership on the part of those whose loyalty to Portugal remains steadfast, but who feel the special interests of the "provinces" are not well understood by Lisbon; (2) separatism, which has, according to some

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Mozambique); and (3)	in Angola (and considerably more in scattered radical oppositionprepared African nationaliststo discredit and hip.

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# Cuban Communists Explain Their Successes to Foreign Comrades

Leaders of the Cuban Communists' Popular Socialist party (PSP) appear to derive considerable satisfaction from explaining the successes of their party over the past two years to representatives of foreign Communist parties. They boast that theirs is the first case of the "victory of the workers and peassants" in a country so far from the centers of Communist power and that their victory disproves the "theory of geographical fatalism," i. e., that a Communist regime cannot come to power in a country in close proximity to the United States.

The Cuban Communists' claim that they prepared the way for and provided decisive support to the Castro revolution in its fight for power is not true. The Communists' real road to power came from adroit manipulation of Fidel Castro's revolutionary victory directly and through crypto-Communists and sympathizers. By posing as the "most revolutionary of the revolutionaries," the Communists became, in Castro's eyes, the most dependable defenders of his revolution against the "plots of imperialism" and the counterrevolutionaries. They also proved willing work horses for the regime, which has faced a shortage of skilled personnel in many fields. By causing Castro to react to US and counterrevolutionary "aggressions" by "retaliations" such as the confiscation of most large and medium private enterprises, the Communists have, in effect, taken the basic steps toward "building socialism" in Cuba without doing it in the name of Communism, which would have been politically impossible before now.

The Communists invariably refer to Castro as Cuba's leader and appear careful never to appear to challenge his authority openly. At the same time, their references to Castro clearly imply that they do not regard him as one of themselves.

The Cuban Communists' claim to be in control of all "mass organizations" in the country is substantially true. They also exert considerable control over the regular armed forces and --especially--the militia. These Communist claims, however, ignore the fact that virtually the entire upper and middle classes

as well as significant portions of the lower classes are actively or passively opposed to Castro and the Communists and that many Cubans who once hailed the revolution as a necessary though drastic effort to solve the country's basic political and socio-economic problems now consider Castro a traitor to the original ideals of the revolution.

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